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Abstract 
In this study, we aim to estimate the daily par yield curve for Japanese agency bonds since 
2002. The agency bond market is one of the most practically and academically disputatious 
areas in terms of whether public agencies as issuers are disciplined by the market. Given the 
drastic reformation of it public agencies in the 2000s, this topic holds far more importance in 
Japan than in other countries. To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first to make 
the par rate of Japanese agency bonds publicly available. Our estimation is based on the 
well-known parametric and spline methods, of which we found that the latter fits well, as in 
previous studies. Further, we have posted the estimation data on our website and will 
continue to update it regularly: http://www.mcnnns77.net. 
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Agency bonds are a relatively new segment in the Japanese bond market. The history of 
the agency bond market dates back a mere 15 years, with the first agency bond issued in 2001. 
Nevertheless, the market has experienced rapid growth within a short time. As of the end of 
September 2015, outstanding agency bonds amount to 33.9 trillion yen ($283 billion),1 
which accounts for 16% of the Japanese bond market, excluding government bonds. Clearly, 
agency bonds have grown to become one of the main bond market segments in Japan. 
The agency bond market also holds importance from an academic viewpoint. Agency 
bonds are issued by government-affiliated financial institutions, incorporated administrative 
agencies, and special corporations with their own credit. However, the central government, 
the owner of these public agencies, does not explicitly guarantee bonds. If investors believe 
that agency bonds issued by an agency with severe fiscal conditions would default, the yield 
would reflect the issuer’s fiscal soundness. On the other hand, if investors expect the 
government to provide emergency financial support to such agencies, the bond yield would 
more or less reflect the issuer’s fiscal condition. Public agencies’ incentive to efficiently 
conduct their businesses on the basis of financial market estimations varies by the existence 
of implicit government guarantees in the agency bond market. To this effect, a key academic 
topic in public finance is the efficient management of the public sector. 
In fact, the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) reform introduced in 2001, which 
permitted public agencies to issue agency bonds, was based on the expectation that market 
discipline would encourage public agencies individually and the government as a whole to 
manage more efficiently. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has empirically 
examined whether this expectation from the reform was satisfied or whether the agency bond 
yield reflects the soundness of issuers’ fiscal conditions, which can be attributed to the lack 
of yield data. Needless to say, when examining whether investors believe that implicit 
government guarantees exist in the agency bond market or the amount of credit risk believed 
to exist in this market, yield levels are the most essential statistics. However, as in the case of 
other bonds, excluding government ones, yield curve data for agency bonds in the secondary 
market is not provided by issuers or public agencies. Bloomberg L.P., a well-known financial 
market data source, estimated Japan’s agency bond yield curve, although the estimation 
period began in 2011 and is relatively short, and the details of the estimation method are not 
publicly available. In addition, Bloomberg covered only eight public agencies. For example, 
                                                        
 
1 The dollar amount is calculated against the exchange rate as of the end of September (USD 1 = 119.8 yen). 
This is the outstanding amount for FILP agency bonds, which slightly differs from agency bonds in this paper 
(Issuing, Redemption, and Outstanding Amounts of Bonds, Japan Securities Dealers Association). 
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the par rates for Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment, one of the largest issuers, 
those for Japan Finance Corporation, and those for Japan International Cooperation Agency 
are unavailable.  
With an aim to fill the gap between academic importance and the limited availability of 
fundamental data, we estimate the yield curve of agency bonds in this study. To do so, we 
extend Hattori and Miyake’s [2016] analysis method, which estimates the yield curve for the 
municipal bond market. However, the history of agency bonds as a market segment is limited 
and the number of bonds issued by many public agencies is insufficient to serve as sample 
data. To overcome this, we carefully reviewed the merger and acquisition reform process of 
public agencies and estimated the yield curve for each “real” issuer (debtor). This provided us 
with more sample data to estimate the yield curve, which can contribute to the fitness of the 
estimation. 
As in Gürkaynak et al. [2007] and Hattori and Miyake [2016], our estimation results are 
provided on our website and will be regularly updated2. The information will be useful to 
academic researchers in Japan and various other countries as well as practitioners in the 
Japanese bond market. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first briefly summarize the two 
yield curve estimation models and, then, describe the sample data and “real issuer” concept. 
Thereafter, we discuss the estimation fitness, followed by concluding remarks. 
 
Yield curve models and estimation 
Following Hattori and Miyake [2016], we estimate the par yield using Svensson [1994] 
and Steeley’s [1991] methods. According to the Bank for International Settlements [BIS; 
2005], the two methods are widely used by many central banks. Kikuchi and Shintani [2012] 
show that B-spline best fits Japanese government bonds. 
First is the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson (NSS) model that is based on Svensson [1994], which 
models the forward rate (f 𝑥 ) using the following functional form:  
 
 f 𝑥 = 𝛼! + 𝛼!exp (−𝑥/𝛼!)+ 𝛼!(𝑥/𝛼!)exp (−𝑥/𝛼!)+ 𝛼!(𝑥/𝛼!)exp (−𝑥/𝛼!) (1) 
 
                                                        
 
2 We have also been admitted into the Japan Securities Dealers Association (JSDA), the data source of our 
estimation. 
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where 𝑥 is the remaining maturity and 𝛼!, 𝛼!, 𝛼!, 𝛼!, 𝛼!,𝛼!  are the parameters to be 
estimated. Equation (1) can be converted into the discount function (d 𝑥 ). 
Second is the B-spline (BS) model based on Steeley’s [1991] model, which estimates the 
discount function using a B-spline function: 
 d x = B(k, x)α!!!"#$-!!!-!  (2) 
 
where B 𝑘, 𝑥  is the B-spline function and α! is the parameter to be estimated. In the 
spline model, we set a sequence of points known as knot points. Steeley [1991] sets the knot 
points as 𝑢!! < ⋯ < 𝑢!!"#$ < 𝑢!!"#$!! < 𝑢!!"#$!! < 𝑢!!"#$!! 3. B 𝑘, 𝑥  is recursively 
defined as shown in Equation (3). 
 B k, x = 𝐵! 𝑘, 𝑥 ≔ {1,𝑢! ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑢!!!0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐷 = 1 B 𝑘, 𝑥 = 𝐵! 𝑘, 𝑥 = !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 𝐵!!! 𝑘 + 1, 𝑥 + !!!!!!!!!!!!! 𝐵!!! 𝑘, 𝑥  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐷 > 1 (3) 
 
Steeley [1991] and Kikuchi and Shintani [2012] set D = 4 in Equation (3). From Equation 
(2) and d(0) = 1, we obtain Equation (4). 
 B k, 0 α! = 1!!"#$-!!!-!  (4) 
 
The discount function can be used to price agency bonds on the basis of the coupon rates 
and maturity dates. We estimate the parameters by minimizing the weighted sum of the 
squared deviations between the actual and estimated prices using the NSS and BS models. 
 
Estimation scope and data source 
In this study, we estimate the yield curve for agency bonds. Japanese public agencies, such 
as government-affiliated financial institutions, incorporated administrative agencies, and 
                                                        
 
3 Following Fujii and Takaoka (2007) ,we set the number of knots with 𝐿! (𝐿!: number of bonds) and 
divided each interval by setting knots that had almost the same number of bonds. 
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special corporations, offer financing by issuing agency and government-guaranteed bonds or 
borrowing from the FILP. Different from the other two financing tools, agency bonds are 
based on issuers’ credit and are not explicitly guaranteed or financially supported by the 
central government. In FY 2014, 16 Japanese agencies issued their own agency bonds.  
Terms such as “FILP agency” and “FILP agency bond” are generally used in Japan, 
although they differ slightly from “public agency” and “agency bond” in this paper. FILP 
agencies borrow money from the FILP in the relevant fiscal year. If an agency borrowed 
from the FILP in FY 2015, but not in FY 2016, it is considered a “FILP agency” only in FY 
2015. Furthermore, the bonds issued by this agency in FY 2015 are categorized as “FILP 
agency bonds,” while those issued in FY 2016 are not. However, from a credit risk viewpoint, 
bonds issued by the same agencies based on identical covenant provisions should be treated 
the same, irrespective of them being issued in FY 2015 or FY 2016. “Public agencies,” in this 
paper, are institutions that have borrowed money at least once from the FILP and “agency 
bonds” are those issued by a public agency on the basis of their own credit. 
As in Hattori and Miyake [2016], we estimate the daily yield curve for each public agency. 
We use only plain vanilla bonds as sample data and exclude floating rates or foreign 
currency-denominated issues, both of which are rarely issued. Moreover, we exclude bond 
issues with less than one-year maturity because their price quotes often do not represent real 
prices. In addition, we focus on straight bonds and exclude asset-backed securities issued by 
the Japan Housing Finance Agency. 
The data source for quotes, maturity dates, and coupon rates is the “Reference Statistical 
Prices [Yields] for OTC Bond Transactions,” released by the Japan Securities Dealers 
Association (JSDA). Our estimation term ranges from August 2, 2002, when JSDA began 
data publication, to December 30, 2015. 
 
“Real” issuer or debtor 
To estimate the yield curve for agency bonds using the NSS function with six parameters, 
we need at least six sample issues in the secondary market. However, most of the current 
public agencies were established or reorganized under the Special Public Institutions Reform 
implemented in the 2000s and, since then, a majority of them have not issued many bonds. 
This could limit our estimation scope. 
Nevertheless, we overcame this problem by focusing on the “real” issuer (debtor) and not 
the nominal issuer. For example, Narita International Airport Corporation (NAA), established 
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in April 2004, issued its first bond in March 2005 and sixth in February 2009. In this case, if 
we focus on the nominal issuer, our estimation term, beginning in February 2009, for NAA’s 
agency bond yield curve would only be six years (2009-2015). However, NAA assumed the 
agency bond repayment duties of the New Tokyo International Airport Authority. According 
to the legal lien, agency bonds issued by the New Tokyo International Airport Authority are 
treated as those issued by NAA itself. Thus, we do not need to distinguish between the bonds 
as in the case of credit risk. In other words, after NAA was established, the “real” issuer or 
debtor of New Tokyo International Airport Authority’s agency bonds was changed to NAA. 
Accordingly, we estimate the yield curve using agency bonds by not only NAA, but also New 
Tokyo International Airport Authority. This estimation policy allowed us to extend our 
estimation term from six to 10 years, beginning March 2005. We treat the Japan Finance 
Organization for Municipalities, Urban Renaissance Agency, and Welfare and Medical 
Service Agency in a similar manner. 
The Japan Finance Corporation (JFC) is a typical merger case of two or more agencies. 
Similar to NAA, JFC assumed agency bond repayment duties from National Life Finance 
Corporation, Japan Finance Corporation for Small and Medium Enterprise, and Agriculture 
Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation.4 The holders of these bonds are expected to 
have the same legal lien as those of JFC’s new bonds. Thus, we could deem JFC as the “real” 
issuer (debtor) of all bonds after the succession in October 2008. A similar case is the Japan 
Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency.  
However, this policy could not be adopted for the Development Bank of Japan Inc. (DBJ). 
In October 2008, DBJ converted its company from a government-affiliated financial 
institution to a special stock corporation, but retained its original name. In this case, while 
agency bonds issued by the former DBJ are attached general collateral, those issued by the 
present DBJ are not. Thus, we were required to differentiate between the two agency bonds 
from a credit risk viewpoint and could not use the former DBJ’s agency bonds as sample data 
to estimate the present DBJ’s yield curve.  
Another case in which our basic policy could not be applied is highway public agencies. In 
October 2005, four highway public corporations—Japan Highway Public Corporation, 
Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation, Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation, and 
                                                        
 
4 In October 2008, the former Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) merged into JFC; however, in 
April 2012, it spun off from JFC as an independent entity. Treatments of agency bonds issued by JBIC differ 
from those issued by other incorporated institutions. Thus, we did not use JBIC’s agency bonds as sample 
data. 
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Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority—were privatized and seven new agencies were 
established. The debt obligations for agency bonds issued by the former four corporations 
were succeeded by the Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment Agency (JEHDRA), 
a newly established highway public agency. However, other new agencies jointly guaranteed 
these bonds with the JEHDRA in several ways and, thus, we differentiated highway agency 
bonds issued before September 2005 from those issued by the JEHDRA after October 2005. 
We took a cautious approach to the reorganization process of public agencies such as those 
mentioned above. As a result, we were able to use 15 active public agencies and eight retired 
agencies, or their agency bonds that existed in part of or throughout the estimation term, in 
the secondary market. Exhibit 1 summarizes our estimation targets and the estimation term 
for the included public agencies. 
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Exhibit 1: Public agencies and estimation terms 
 
Note: “Operation Term” for the Japan Finance Organization for Municipalities includes that for the Japan 
Finance Organization for Municipal Enterprises.  
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Results 
To check the fitness of the NSS and BS methods, we use an estimation error, which can be 
defined as the difference between the actual and model-implied prices. We use the root mean 
squared error (RMSE) and maximum absolute error (MaxAE), calculated as follows: 
 RMSE = !! (y!-y!)!!!!!  (5) MaxAE = max! |𝑦!−𝑦!| , i = 1,… ,n (6) 
 
where N is the number of observed bonds, 𝑦! is the actual (observed) yield to maturity, and 𝑦! is the par yield estimated using the NSS and BS models. 
Exhibit 2 presents the median of the RMSE and MaxAE for each agency on the basis of 
the BS and NSS models using times series data from August 2002 to December 2015 (data is 
included when N is greater than or equal to six). Exhibit 2 also shows that the fit of the BS 
model is better than that of the NSS model, which is consistent with Kikuchi and Shintani 
[2012] and Hattori and Miyake [2016]. In the BS model, the RMSE is around 0.01%, with 
some exceptions. The MaxAE of the BS model is still small, that is, 0.01 to 0.04%, although 
the MaxAE for the JEHDRA is greater than 0.10%.  
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The larger MaxAE for the JEHDRA can be attributed to the fact that it issued a higher 
number of over-20-year bonds (see Exhibit 3) and the liquidity of the longer bonds is lower, 
Exhibit 2: Median of RMSE and MaxAE for sampled agency bonds  
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especially for non-government bonds in Japan’s bond market.5 Exhibit 4 depicts the curve 
for JEHDRA on May 30, 2014, and that the curve is not smoother, particularly for 
over-20-year bonds. In addition, in 2009, JEHDRA was the first in Japan to issue deep 
discount bonds (DDBs), and the curve includes DDBs. If we exclude over-20-year bonds for 
JEHDRA, the medians of RMSE and MaxAE are 0.011% and 0.034%, respectively, which 
are almost the same as the errors of the other issuers. 
                                                        
 
5 In the JGB market, there are many liquidity maintenance systems, enhancing the liquidity of bonds with 
longer terms, such as reopening and auctions for enhancing liquidity. However, there is no such liquidity 
maintenance system for the agency bond market in Japan. 
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Exhibit 3: Median of RMSE for NSS-fitted curve by maturity and for shares of over 20 
years 
 
Note: “-” indicates there are no data in the grid. 
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 Exhibit 3 shows the medians of RMSE and MaxAE for the NSS model by maturity term and 
helps us to further understand why the NSS model is not a good fit. It shows that the error for 
the short and medium terms is about 0.01 to 0.02%, with some exception. On the other hand, 
the error of an over-10-year bond is much larger (in particular, the error for the 20- to 30-year 
bond is greater than 0.2%). This result is the same as that for Japan’s municipal bond market, 
analyzed by Hattori and Miyake [2016], thus showing that the NSS model is not a good fit in 
terms of longer maturity periods. 
 
Conclusion 
In this study, we estimated the par rate of Japan’s agency bonds and have made the data 
publicly accessible. Our estimates cover the wide range of agency bonds and are available at 
daily frequencies for over 10 years, data that has not been provided by leading resources of 
information such as Bloomberg. We carefully treated mergers and reorganized 
government-affiliated financial institutions, which is particularly difficult when analyzing 
Japan’s agency bonds. We estimated the yield curve for agency bonds using a B-spline and 
the Nelson–Siegel–Svensson approach, and found the B-spline method to be a better fit and 
Exhibit 4: Par yield curve of Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment 	
(May 30, 2014) 
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an academically based, clear method for economists and practitioners conducting similar 
analyses. 
An analysis of agency bonds holds great significance for Japan’s bond market and fiscal 
problems. In the late 20th century, FILP played a significant role in Japan’s financial system. 
In 2001, it drastically reformed in terms of financial liberalization and globalization. The aim 
of this reform was to reduce the size of the government and ensure the efficient management 
of government-affiliated financial institutions by introducing market discipline. It has been 
more than 10 years since the reform and we must consider not only the validity of the reform, 
but also the empirical research of the agency bond market. However, to the best of our 
understanding, no empirical research has been conducted and we suspect that the availability 
of public data underpins this problem. We also believe that our paper can drive empirical 
research on FLIP. In conclusion, and importantly, the complete dataset is available online 
(http://www.mcnnns77.net) and will be regularly updated. 
 
Acknowledgements 
We thank Koji Matsumoto for the technical support as well as Hajime Fujiwara (Financial 
Service Agency), Kohei Shintani (Bank of Japan), and Toshiaki Watanabe (Hitotsubashi 
University) for their helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the 
authors alone and not of any affiliation. 
 
References 
Bank for International Settlements. “Zero-Coupon Yield Curves: Technical 
Documentation.” BIS paper No. 25, 2005. 
Fujii, Mariko, M. Takaoka. “The Term Structure and the Macroeconomy: An Application of 
the Nelson-Siegel Model.” FSA Research Review, 4 (2007), pp. 219-248. 
Gürkaynak, Refet S., B. Sack, J. H Wright. “The U.S. Treasury Yield Curve: 1961 to the 
Present.” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 54, No. 8 (2007), pp. 2291-2304. 
Hattori, Takahiro, H. Miyake. “The Japan Municipal Bond Yield Curve: 2002 to the Present.” 
International Journal of Economics and Finance, 8 (2016, forthcoming). 
Kikuchi, Kentaro, K. Shintani. “Comparative Analysis of Zero Coupon Yield Curve 
Estimation Methods Using JGB Price Data.” No. 12-E-04, Institute for Monetary and 
Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2012. 
Steeley, James M. “Estimating the Gilt-Edged Term Structure: Basis Splines and Confidence 
Intervals.” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1991), pp. 
 15 
513-529. 
Svensson, Lars E.O. “Estimating Forward Interest Rates with the Extended Nelson and Siegel 
Method.” Sveriges Riksbank Quarterly Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1995), pp. 13-26. 
